ABSTRACT. When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not. I 1. We can single out a class of speech acts by the following feature: they are directed to another. When one thanks another for something, or advises them against something, or refuses something from them, one speaks not (or not only) about them, but to them. One addresses them. This is a relation that one stands in to them. To understand these acts is (inter alia) to understand this relation. More fully, it is to understand a neglected manner or mode of de re intentionality: a manner of relational directedness that is not merely directedness at a particular object, but directedness to (a fellow) subject.
I
1. We can single out a class of speech acts by the following feature: they are directed to another. When one thanks another for something, or advises them against something, or refuses something from them, one speaks not (or not only) about them, but to them. One addresses them. This is a relation that one stands in to them. To understand these acts is (inter alia) to understand this relation. More fully, it is to understand a neglected manner or mode of de re intentionality: a manner of relational directedness that is not merely directedness at a particular object, but directedness to (a fellow) subject.
2. How should we understand this manner of intentionality? We find it exemplified in intentional actions-specifically, in speech acts-such as those just mentioned. An intentional action is a realization or an execution of a practical thought-an intention, or volition, or desire. Here, then, is a suggestion: only when a suitable practical thought is realized is this manner of intentionality exemplified; outside of the context of an intentional action of the relevant sort (such as a speech act), it is not to be found.
3. My central aim in this essay is to undermine this suggestion. I will outline an influential account of intentional actions that exhibit this mode of intentionality-an account due to Jennifer Hornsby.
1 And I will suggest that it is a consequence of this account that this mode of intentionality must be exhibited not only in realized practical thoughts of the sort the account articulates, but in other contexts too; specifically, in unrealized practical thoughts-pure intentions, or volitions, or desires. 2 
II
4. Let us call the intentional actions that Hornsby's account accounts for actions of address. For there to be an action of this sort, the following conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be two subjects-an addressor, X, and an addressee, Y; second, X must have a volition to address Y-X must try to address Y; 3 third, Y must recognize that X is trying to address Y-only if Y recognizes this is X's practical thought realized. 6. It cannot be a merely general representation-"I am trying to address another." X is not merely trying to address an other-any old other-but a particular other, Y.
7. We might think we can deal with this by introducing, into the content of the practical thought, a demonstrative element that serves to single out Y from the manifold of subjects-"I am trying to address this person." That is an element of singular thought constituted by perception: it is through perceiving Y-standing to Y in that relation-that X singles out Y in this way. And it can seem to be exactly what we need.
8. But this content seems to be inadequate, by the lights of Hornsby's account. For her account holds that, for the volition to be realized, Y must recognize that X is trying to address Y. And it seems clear how this thought-Y's recognitionrepresents Y. It does not represent Y in the perceptual-demonstrative manner, as this person. (Perhaps we can imagine recherché cases in which it does; but in the typical case, it does not-and that is all we need be concerned with here.) It rather represents Y in the first-personal manner; it is the thought that Y could express by saying "X is trying to address me"-the thought that X is trying to address Y herself, as we might say.
9. This thought, however, does not merely represent Y in this manner; it represents X's volition as itself representing Y in this manner. And this thought is not merely a thought; it is recognition-and so, knowledge. So, the way it represents X's volition as representing Y must be the way that X 10. The upshot is that, because Y's recognition does represent Y in the firstpersonal manner, so does X's volition. The verbal expression for this manner of representation, on Y's lips, as it applies to Y, is "me." On X's lips, its verbal expression, as it applies to Y, is "you." So, the answer to the question of §3 is-"I am trying to address you." This is not a perceptual-demonstrative way of thinking. And yet, just like such a manner of thinking, it is an element of singular thought. It is the first-person way of thinking. What is distinctive about this practical thought is that it thinks in this way, not merely of the subject of the thought, but of another subject. So, there is something misleading about simply calling this the first-person way of thinking. It is equally the second-person way.
11. The difficulty for the suggestion (of §2) can now be stated. X's volition to address Y, whether it is realized in action or not, is such as to represent Y-the one to whom the putative act of address is directed-in the first-/second-person manner; it represents Y in the manner expressible by X with "you," and by Y with "me." Such a volition just is an exemplification of the mode of de re intentionality which is the topic of this essay. In having this volition, X does not merely think about or of Y; X thinks toward Y. Directedness to a fellow subject is a property of the practical thoughts that inform speech acts, whether or not these thoughts are realized in intentional actions. So, it cannot be that the present mode of intentionality is exemplified merely in realized practical thought; it must be exemplified in pure practical thought as well.
12. We can put the point by saying that our topic is a mode of intentionality which is not merely de re, but de se, and de se toward another-for X thinks of Y as Y herself; X's thought represents Y in the very manner that Y represents Y when Y thinks of herself in that manner which she can express with "me." And this is a manner that can be exemplified not just in intentional actions-such as speech acts-but also in pure practical thoughts.
III
13. This conclusion opens into a further issue, which I would like to end by raising.
14. It is an integral feature of Hornsby's account that X's volition to address Y is realized only if Y recognizes that X intends to address Y herself. Combining that feature with the suggestion (of §2) yields the thought that it is a condition of X's thinking toward Y-of X's thinking of Y in the first-/second-person manner-that Y recognizes that X thinks of her in this manner. 6 For only if she so recognizes this is X's volition realized, and, according to the suggestion (of §2), only if X's volition is realized is our manner of de re/de se intentionality exemplified-the manner that is X's thinking toward Y. Of course, it cannot be right that the manner is exemplified only if X's volition is realized; it is exemplified even if X's volition remains pure. And perhaps this condition should be weakened so that it says merely that Y is able to recognize that X thinks of her in this manner. But something like this seems needed in order to distinguish the present mode of de re/de se intentionality from the mode of de re intentionality exemplified in perceptual-demonstrative thinking: in both, it is a condition of the mode's exemplification that the object thought of in this manner exists; but in the former, there is the further condition that the object is a subject who is able to recognize that she herself is thought of in this manner, and therefore is able to think of herself as herself.
15. But this raises a question. It seems that X can have a pure practical thought directed toward Y even if X does not engage in any overt addressive actions, or indeed in any overt behavior at all which is in any sense informed by the thought at issue. And yet, it is a condition of X's having such a de re/de se thought about Y that Y is able to recognize that she is thought of by X in this way-whether the thought is realized in action, or expressed in behavior, or not. How is this possible? For there to be something for Y to recognize, X's thought must be in some sense publicly available. But how could X's thought be publicly available, if it is not expressed either in addressive actions, or in non-intentional but still expressive behavior on X's part?
16. It is an assumption of this difficulty that (as we might put it) X has (or is) a body: X is present in the public world, and is capable of realizing thoughts in intentional action and expressing thoughts in behavior. The difficulty is that it seems that X can have thoughts toward another that are neither so realized nor so expressed-and yet are such as to be apprehensible by the one to whom they are directed nonetheless. It cannot be through X (or his body's) doing anything to make these thoughts publicly available that they are made available-be it moving in distinctive ways, or striking distinctive poses, either of which might be considered manifestations of the thoughts' presence. 7 How then can X (or his body) make them available? The answer is: not by doing anything, but simply by being. It is not through engaging in action, or manifesting a distinctive gait, etc., that X (or his body) makes his thought available to Y, but simply through being (or having) a body with the kind of articulation that he (his body) has.
17. This was the view of J. G. Fichte-it is central to his Foundations of Natural Right. And it seems to be a view we need. It says that having (or being) a body is, as such, the expression of a thought directed toward anyone with the ability to recognize that they are being thought toward. As we might put it: simply in having (or being) the bodies we do (or are), we think toward anyone who is able to acknowledge our address in return. Address is not merely a character of intentional actions. It is to be found wherever thinking toward another is to be found. And thinking toward another, the recognizable actuality that it is, is to be found wherever there is a body with the kind of articulation that our bodies (we) have. The human body is an act of address. 8 18. In the context of contemporary Anglophone philosophy-and perhaps in other contexts too 9 -this is a highly unfamiliar idea. But-as far as I can see-it is an idea that we need, in order to make sense of the special mode of de re/de se intentionality that is our topic. We began by trying to understand this manner by thinking through Hornsby's account of addressive action. We have ended with Fichte's conception of the body.
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